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Two New Case Developments in
Landlord-Tenant Law
Myron Moskovitz

Introduction

My good friend Roger Bernhardt asked me to write a
piece on some recent landlord-tenant cases. In a past life,
I was somewhat of a maven in this area. Now I’ve moved
on, having just formed a new appellate law firm with
some retired appellate justices and law clerks—and, of
course, Roger, the state’s leading expert in real property
litigation. See MoskovitzAppellateTeam.com.
So, here’s my contribution to this august journal.
Anti-SLAPP Motions: Olive Props., LP v
Coolwaters Enters., Inc.

An “anti-SLAPP” motion to strike a complaint (see
CCP §425.16) is a powerful tool in the hands of a clever
defense counsel. As soon as it’s filed, everything stops—
except the motion. Trial is stayed. Even discovery is
stayed. If the motion is denied, the defendant can
immediately appeal—and everything stays stayed.
In an unlawful detainer case, of course, the landlord
wants nothing stayed. He wants to get to trial, judgment,
and eviction ASAP.
So, the tenant’s lawyer should look for every
opportunity to use the anti-SLAPP motion, right? Not so
fast....
In Olive Props., LP v Coolwaters Enters., Inc. (2015)
241 CA4th 1169 (reported at p 20), a shopping center
owner filed an unlawful detainer complaint based on
nonpayment of rent and common area maintenance
charges. The tenant filed an anti-SLAPP motion, claiming
the action was filed to punish the tenant for filing an
earlier action against the owner for breach of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment (by renting another space to a pizza
restaurant whose customers allegedly took up all of the
available parking spaces). The trial court denied the
tenant’s motion, finding the tenant had failed to satisfy the
“first prong” of the anti-SLAPP procedure (i.e., a prima
facie case that the present suit was brought to punish
activity protected by the First Amendment) because the
tenant had failed to supply evidence that the landlord
brought his unlawful detainer action because the tenant
had sued the landlord.
The court of appeal affirmed, noting that “merely
because Tenant’s lawsuit for breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment and negligent interference with
prospective economic relations preceded Landlord’s
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unlawful detainer action does not mean that the unlawful
detainer action arose from Tenant’s protected activity in
bringing the prior lawsuit.” 241 CA4th at 1176 (emphasis
in original). The court noted the danger the tenant’s claim
posed: “[A] nonpaying tenant should not be able to
frustrate or stall an anticipated eviction by filing a
preemptive complaint against the landlord, followed by a
special motion to strike the landlord’s unlawful detainer
complaint on the ground it arose out of the tenant’s
protected petitioning activity in filing the first lawsuit.”
241 CA4th at 1176.
The court might have also noted that when the
unlawful detainer suit is based on nonpayment of rent, it
would seldom make sense to find that it was brought for
some reason other than a desire to get rid of a nonpaying
tenant. Isn’t getting the rent the whole point of renting out
property? Unless the landlord had a history of putting up
with late payment or nonpayment, his motive would seem
to be to collect rent, not to punish the tenant.
The court also affirmed the trial court’s award of
attorney fees against the tenant for bringing a frivolous
anti-SLAPP motion, noting that the tenant had “succeeded
in stalling the unlawful detainer action for a protracted
period of time by bringing a meritless special motion to
strike.” 241 CA4th at 1172. The amount awarded ($3392)
wasn’t much because not much litigation happened up to
the ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion. But I’ve seen
heavier anti-SLAPP battles that could have resulted in
much higher awards.
The bottom line: It’s OK to use it, but don’t abuse it.
There are other more effective and time-tested pretrial
motions and defenses that a tenant can successfully
launch in defending an unlawful detainer action. See, e.g.,
California Landlord-Tenant Practice, chap 10 (2d ed Cal
CEB). For discussion of anti-SLAPP motions in landlordtenant actions generally, see Landlord-Tenant §§5.18A–
5.18B, 7.78B.
Materiality of Breach of Lease: Boston,
LLC v Juarez

Here’s a curious appellate department opinion that
won’t be followed, in my humble opinion. In Boston, LLC
v Juarez (2015) 240 CA4th Supp 28 (reported at 38 CEB
RPLR 158 (Nov. 2015)), the rental agreement provided
that “any failure” to comply with the terms of the
agreement would allow the landlord to terminate the
tenant’s right to possession. The court held that because
of this provision, the tenant’s failure to obtain renter’s
insurance (required under the rental agreement) allowed
the landlord to evict, whether or not the breach was
material.
This is a very questionable decision. It allows
landlords—simply by inserting into the agreement a
boilerplate provision that prospective tenants may not

2

January 2016

even notice—to evade the well-established materiality
requirement, which is designed to protect tenants from
losing their homes and businesses for trivial breaches. In
rent control jurisdictions, the decision might provide a
convenient means to evict tenants paying below-market
rent, in order to raise rents to market levels—thereby
undermining the ordinance’s requirement that landlords
have just cause to evict. See, e.g., Landlord-Tenant, chap
7.
There are many other California court of appeal
decisions not allowing an eviction for a trivial breach of
the lease. See, e.g., Landlord-Tenant §§8.58–8.60, 7.57.

Our Supreme Court Tackles
Greenhouse Gas Analysis in EIRs
Alan Ramo

Introduction

The California Supreme Court probably surprised a
few observers when it rejected the California Department
of Fish and Wildlife’s greenhouse gas analysis of the
Newhall Ranch development in its recent decision in
Center for Biological Diversity v Department of Fish &
Wildlife (2015) 62 C4th 204 (reported at p 13). State
appellate courts have been rather deferential to challenges
to the implementation of California’s Global Warming
Solutions Act (known as AB 32). See Our Children’s
Earth Found. v California Air Resources Bd. (2015) 234
CA4th 870; Association of Irritated Residents v Air
Resources Bd. (2012) 206 CA4th 1487, reported at 35
CEB RPLR 135 (Sept. 2012). Courts hesitate to wade into
technical expert analyses such as greenhouse gas
emissions analysis.
Nevertheless, the supreme court’s large majority (5–2)
did not hesitate to dive into the CEQA “significance”
analysis contained in the project’s environmental impact
report (EIR) and find a fundamental flaw in the project’s
attempt to use as guidance the state Air Resources
Board’s (ARB) approach to greenhouse gas regulation.
Perhaps even more alarming to proponents of greenhouse
gas-emitting projects, the court, while accepting ARB’s
AB 32 emission reduction goal as a CEQA “threshold”
for significance, at the same time questioned the
threshold’s continued utility after 2020, when more
dramatic reductions will be required under state climate
change laws. Lurking in the court’s willingness to
question the project-level compliance with the AB 32
significance threshold calculation is the court’s skepticism
toward game-playing with such baselines. For an
analogous situation, though not cited by the court, see
Neighbors for Smart Rail v Exposition Metro Line Constr.
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Auth. (2013) 57 C4th 439, discussed by Golden Gate
University Professor Paul S. Kibel in Sea Level Rise,
Saltwater Intrusion and Endangered Fisheries—Shifting
Baselines for the Bay Delta Conservation Plan, 38
Environs: Envt’l L & Pol’y J 259, 260 (Spring 2015). See
also Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and
Who Loses?, 20 Hastings W-NW J Envt’l L & Pol’y 109
(2014).
Analysis

Because this case was brought under CEQA, the
court’s analysis is through a CEQA lens rather than
simply a policy analysis. The legal issue before the court
was whether the EIR properly analyzed whether the
greenhouse gases from the proposed development
(anticipated to house more than 50,000 people) are
significant and thus require mitigation. Alternatively, if
there are unavoidable impacts after deploying all feasible
and reasonable mitigations, a statement of overriding
considerations would be required if the project’s benefits
are deemed to outweigh its impacts.
The court first analyzed what kind of a cumulative
impact problem is presented by greenhouse gas emissions
in California. It recognized that California emissions have
global impact and that any individual project’s impacts
are uncertain. However, the question was whether this
project, together with present and future projects, is
cumulatively considerable. The court then determined that
it was appropriate to reference state policies that are
attempting to address California’s reasonable contribution
to a solution to climate change, which led it to accept
ARB’s plan to achieve AB 32’s goal of a reduction to
1990 emission levels as a suitable significance threshold.
That plan requires a 29 percent reduction of emissions
from what the level of emissions would have been in
2020—the so-called “business as usual” scenario. In
developing its analysis, the court cited extensively to an
article authored by Sandy Crockett, the Bay Area Air
Quality Management District’s counsel, published by the
GGU Environmental Law Journal—an article every
practitioner representing a project proponent or opponent
should review. See Crockett, Addressing the Significance
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under CEQA: California’s
Search for Regulatory Certainty in an Uncertain World, 4
Golden Gate U Envt’l LJ 203 (July 2011).
The court found that while the project would add
greenhouse gases to the environment, the issue was
whether the added emissions were less than what would
happen without the project. After all, the population that
would live in the city would live somewhere else;
somewhere else may lead to even more emissions.
Further, the project should be designed to contribute its
appropriate share of reductions consistent with ARB’s AB
32 plan.

